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"wisdom," by "Justice and equity," etc.—a list of virtues which roughly corresponds to the six images set at the portal of Lemaire's temple: Religion, Prudence, Justice, Equity, Espérance and Raison.

In E. K.'s famous epistle to Gabriel Harvey he suggests that Spenser wrote in pastoral form, "mynding to furnish our tongue with this kinde, wherein it faulteth." Just how he could ignore Barclay's five Eclogues, is not very clear. They must have been fairly well known at that day, even if they were not very highly valued. Indeed, it is possible that he had Barclay's 'Prologue' definitely in mind when he wrote this particular passage. The "example of the best and most auncient Poetes, which devised this kind of wryting, being both so base for the matter, and homely for the manner, at the first to trye theyr habilitie," had already been cited by Barclay:

Therefore wise Poetes to sharpe and proue their wit,  
In homely iestes wrote many a mery fit,  
Before they durst be of audacitie  
Taunter things of weyght and grauitie.

The simile, "as young birdes, that be newly crept out of the nest, by little first to prove theyr tender wyngs, before they make a greater flyght," may be set beside another passage in the 'Prologue,'

The birde unused first flying from her nest  
Dare not aduenture, and is not bolde nor prest  
With winges abroade to flye as doth the olde, etc.

And it is surely significant that the first five pastoral poets in E. K.'s list—Theocritus, Virgile, Mantuane, Petrarque and Boccaccio—are the five poets mentioned by Barclay, in the same unusual order. For the obscure lines,

What shall I speake of the father auncient,  
Which in briebe language both playne and eloquent,  
Betwene Alatheia, Sewstis stoute and bolde  
Hath made rehearsall of all thy storyes olde,  
By true historyes us teaching to obiect  
Against wayne fables of olde Gentiles sect,

must allude to Boccaccio. They suggest, to be sure, the title and the professed purpose of his *Genealogia Deorum Gentilium*, rather than his sixteen Latin Eclogues.

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## STYLE AND HABIT: A NOTE.

A systematic and exhaustive study of literary style from the psychological point of view yet remains to be undertaken. Hitherto the studies put forward in English from this point of view have been inadequate, and, with the exception of Spencer's erroneous essay, distressingly vague and general. DeQuincey's essay was seminal, but only seminal. His Organology and Mechanology, and his passage on Publication, are too brief and general to be called developed theses: DeQuincey would not descend to Spencer's minuteness. On the other hand, Lewes, though always promising something detailed and definite, never really settles down from his inspiring platitudes. Renton, to mention but one more, has preferred the logical point of view, and in his plethora of metaphysics upon sensibility has parted company with the strictly individual character of style. The French attempts are almost equally disappointing. When engaged in a search for those peculiarities and nuances of mental make-up which distinguish the infinite varieties of individuals, one from the other, it is neither sufficient to divide mankind in general, as De Gourmont does, into two great classes *les visuels et les émotifs*, nor satisfying to account for any one individual, as Hennequin would, by predicating him with an over-development of the third frontal convolution. Such observations are undoubtedly valuable, but they are woefully fragmentary when put side by side with the mental complexity which is present in any great writer and which, by its multiple variations of tendency and emphasis, constitutes the unique thing called his individual character. To conduct a thorough-going, psychological inquiry into literary style is a task whose general magnitude is equalled only by the minuteness of its particular details. Not one or two principles of a general nature, not one or two categories for the distribution of mankind from China to Peru, but rather the application of well-nigh all the observations of an entire two-volumed psychology to each author contemplated, and the careful notation of varying values and tendencies in each case, is what is needed and what has never been undertaken.

In essaying such a task the old confusion of four points of view, which has been the cause and

bane of all the loose discussion of the subject at the hands of those mysteriously blest with a "literary sense," would easily be avoided. These views, the descriptive, æsthetic, pedagogical, and genetic points of view, have seldom been rigorously segregated or even properly distinguished in prose-style theory from Aristotle to Spencer. The adoption of the genetic or psychological view, including as it does the conception of style as a normal aspect of ordinary psychic functioning in words, and therefore a common aspect of all writing, good or bad, but varying in its details of tendency and emphasis from individual to individual, excludes alike the æsthetic conception of style as "good-style," the descriptive definition based upon the reader's general and vague "sense" of an author's style, and the pedagogical precept that style is a detachable ornament or a mere thing of verbal and syntactical mechanism which may be learned by clever address to the rules of rhetoric. The genetic view recognizes with primary emphasis that thought and feeling processes, and verbal expression, and the psychological inter-relations of these, furnish the materials for definite categorical investigation. Æsthetic appreciation and pedagogical fervor must not interfere in a purely genetic inquiry.

The two primary facts mentioned above, that style is an aspect of all writing, except strict compilation, and that it is something that varies as we pass from individual to individual, suggest the method to be adopted in a psychological inquiry into the nature of literary style. The first fact embraces the material of the inquiry (mind expressed in written words). And of this material three aspects must be considered: the nature and kinds of thought (including emotions and feelings), the relations of thought to words, and, finally, the relations of words to each other, grammatically and syntactically considered. The field indicated is of course the whole field of general psychology *plus* the special fields of the psychology of written expression and the science of grammar and syntax. But the work in these fields has, fortunately, been already done, for the most part by specialists within each territory. Of their rich results the methodical student of style may now avail himself. The least developed field is that

of the psychology of the written word as distinguished from the spoken word. Of course the old and much debated question of thought with words and thought without words will necessarily pop up and prove something of a bogey; but now-a-days there is much new light upon this matter; and, besides, for the actual production of written words, which involves a concurrent stream of thought and words, the question is hardly of deterrent importance. On the other hand, far more attention than ever before must be paid to the influence of the so-called sub-conscious factors which play a prime part in the production of what is termed "inspired writing." Here, too, much material and observation have been collected, especially of late, by trained specialists.

The second primary fact (style is a variant which varies with the individual) suggests the next step in method. It is obvious that in psychology, as in any organic science, the character of individuality is distinguished by the variations of the particular subject within a common generic type. Now the multiplicity of such variations in the psychologic individual is as highly as it is intangibly increased over the variations in the anatomical individual; and if these variations of mental and emotional economy always occurred in an unique and sporadic fashion, their very multiplicity and ephemeral nature would produce a confusion of successive, aberrant individualities instead of that fairly stable thing which we call the character of the individual. In a word, variation alone will produce individuality within a species, but variation alone will not produce what in the human species we call individuality of character. The definiteness of this latter appearance demands a corresponding definiteness or regularity in individual variations. Instead of sporadic cases, the variations must assume a repetitive tendency. A tendency to act consistently and repeatedly in certain ways, which are at more or less variance with the ways of other people, is what constitutes individuality of character.

It is necessary, therefore, when once the description of thought relations and thought-word relations in general is as far as possible complete, to observe what funding and coördination of particular variations any particular author's case presents,—what variations by their repetition

evinced stable tendencies. In the case of Shelley's prose, for instance, the lyrical progression of his thought by imaginative rather than ratiocinative association of ideas and images is a trick so often repeated that it becomes at once a peculiarity and a stable peculiarity, *i. e.*, a stable variation. Thus that variation of individuality of character to which common experience gives an aphoristic recognition, but which is rather recognized than definitely conceived, may be somewhat exactly analyzed and accounted for. To be sure, the analysis will involve a statement of variation in degree and emphasis from common kinds of mental action even more often than a statement of variation in quality, but the very difficulty of such statements goes a long way to explain rationally the prevailing vagueness of appreciations of literary characters. Moreover, it may be noted in passing, that perhaps written speech alone offers that quality of permanency which is necessary to the object of a minute psychological analysis into character; and, as Renton well observes, a psychological inquiry into style may throw much new light upon psychology itself. That the writing of an author shows him only in certain moods and delineates his character at its best rather than in its entirety, is a contingency which, while it rather fortunately eliminates for us comparatively unessential traits, may yet be minimized, if that is thought desirable, in cases where the more pretentious literary remains of an author are supplemented by his familiar, undress expression in diaries or letters.

To such regular variations of thought-feeling and thought-word relations, which in their synthetic complexity present the author's character through the somewhat deflecting media of words, may be applied the term style. Variations which are not coördinated by repetition cannot be said to constitute a style. In this sense, and in this sense only, a writer may be said to have no style; but that is practically equivalent to saying that all writing has style, since ignorance most of all has its regularity of stupidity. Occasionally the sporadic variation is so exaggerated as to obtrude itself strongly upon the attention,—as in the case of a single poetic figure in a text-book in mathematics. But that sporadic variation is to be noted as such: it would not justify one in speaking of

the poetic style of the book. Where the variation is sufficient in degree or kind to be termed pathological, style becomes striking in its bizarre and extravagant effects—those effects which, usually apprehended most easily, are most definitely described. But for those other, usual, and more subtle traits of individual style which, though perceiving, we despair of describing save in the vaguest of figures, the regular variations within the limits of the normal may be taken as the cause.

But these regular variations of thought and thought-word relations, these more or less stable tendencies coördinated by repetition, present to the psychologist a law of functioning which has already been deeply studied in other than literary phenomena; and the present literary problem should be studied in the light of what has already been determined from the study of the same character of functioning in other and similar contents. This law of function is called Habit. Literary style therefore should be investigated as a problem in the psychology of habit, and upon it should be brought to bear all those discovered data and principles which are now included by psychologists under the category of habit. The observations of James, Tarde, Baldwin, and Jastrow would yield rich results if properly applied. The circular-reaction theory and the laws of imitation and invention, for instance, would go a long way to supply the discipline of style and rhetoric with that philosophical basis which the methodical mind of Spencer desired. The formation of individual habits by direct and original adaptation to environment or by indirect and imitative adaptation, by chance variation or enforced instruction; the refractive aspect of imitation; the growth of types of association; the imitative susceptibility and the inventive inclination,—these are only a very few of the principles which would find a rich illustration in the facts and functions of style. The concrete and picturesque elements of style, or its rhythmic effects, whether these belonged to an Isaiah or to a Sir Thomas Browne, to an Inca of Peru or to a Jeremy Taylor; the style of a retired dreamer like Amiel, or of an empire-dreamer like Sir Walter Raleigh; the style of one who talks and writes rather for effect than for matter; the style which is the product of expression concurrent

with thought, as compared with that which belongs to the expression of a thesis already carefully elaborated into logical proportions; the style of the verbalist, or of the abstractionist; or of the emotionalist; of the theologian, or the mystic, or the reformer; of the spectator, or of the participator; the grand style, the *estilo culto*, the metaphysical style, the precious style,—these are only a very few of the aspects of style which would receive their proper explanation and coördination. Moreover, the social aspects of habit, if sought in literary style, would afford to the latter an adequate theory of what is more vaguely designated as the style of a literary period or epoch, or of a race, and would assign to Taine's *milieu* its proper place in the economy of style. The “isms” of style would be explained—Euphuism, Marinism, Gongorism, Asianism, Atticism, Rhetoricism. Individual habit as subjected to the requirements of an external authority, with its temporized acquiescence or flaring revolt—the set of problems so ably discussed by Bagehot and Royce and Tarde—would find its literary homologue in the syntactical and metrical aspects of style and in the impositions of the various literary types. Finally, certain general habits of thinking underlying all these variations would be distinguished as such; and, consequently, instead of speaking of a narrative or expository style, it would be realized that here there is a difference, which must be expressed by speaking of the narrative manner, or expository manner. Style is individual habit within the general manner of a type or kind.

When once it becomes clearly understood that style is a case of habit, the difficulties of the subject begin to clear. Such expressions as “Le style est de l'homme même,” or style is the “physiognomy of the mind,” take their place as figurative statements of the matter of habit. The chief characteristics of the conception—its vagueness and “indefinableness”—are accounted for by the complexity of subjective habits. The old quarrel as to the propriety of extending the word *style* to all writing or to *belles lettres* alone, is systematically solved. The demand of the literary student for a definite program of work is met so far as the science of mental habit can be brought within observation and definition, and the student understands forthwith in what boundaries his sub-

ject lies, and how far he can treat it methodically—how far science may go, and where appreciation must begin. Nor, to adopt the pedagogical view for a moment, will anyone who has taught literary composition fail to recognize that in the definition of style as habit lies the description, as well as the secret, of his labor with young, untutored minds whose habits have been ignorantly and unconsciously formed.

It would not be venial, even in a mere note such as this, to neglect the warning that must accompany any such minute task as the one here recommended. The task, to be sure, would amount to nothing so much as to restating all our loose criticism of the present on a methodical and as near as might be scientific basis—the basis in psychology long since recommended and prophesied by DeQuincey. The task is not so much revolutionary as supplementary and definitive. But dryly and unimaginatively followed, without the proper generalization, the analysis contemplated would inevitably degenerate into a labor as useless as that of the *Rhetores Græci* themselves; and for the old mechanical discipline, another, quite as defunct, would be substituted. The results of the analyses of style-habits can find their justification only in a wider definition of spiritual meaning and a completer, more authentic conception of the inter-relations of particular characters in the social organism.

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#### THE SINGULAR FATE OF A PASSAGE IN FREYTAG'S *DIE JOURNALISTEN*.

Responding to the editor's request, I submit the following statements as supplementary to my previous article, “A Curious Mistake in Freytag's *Die Journalisten*,” published in the *Modern Language Notes*, vol. XXIII, pp. 180–1, June, 1908.

Some half-dozen annotated editions of *Die Journalisten*, as we have seen, give the reading ‘*Zeitung*,’ instead of the suggested version ‘*Zeit*,’ in the passage previously indicated. In view of the additional evidence now at hand, it seems